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cash payments in lieu of commissary privileges. A cost comparison was conducted
in order to determine the feasibility of direct cash payments. It compares active
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the
privatization alternative of direct cash payments in lieu of
commissary privileges. Due to a shifting national focus aimed
at reducing Department of Defense (DOD) force levels including
weapons procurement, no program is safe from budget cutting
scrutiny. The reduction has affected all areas of Defense and
has become known as "downsizing." The privatization methods
introduced during the 1980' s might continue to serve the
military by better utilizing future shrinking Defense budgets.
During the 1980' s, the Reagan Administration introduced
initiatives to reduce the expanse of the Federal Government.
Government operations that could be performed by the private
sector were considered as candidates for divestiture. The
private sector was invited to challenge government activities
by submitting competitive bids for government work. This form
of privatization challenged every area of government including
the commissary system.
The military commissary system emerged from World War II
as a highly competitive national grocery chain. Prior to the
1990' s, it was ranked as one of the top five grocery chains
based on annual gross sales. However, during the early 1990 's
its sales growth began to diminish in relation to the rest of
the grocery industry. In 1993, it was only ranked as seventh
among national grocery chains. Despite this reduction in
annual sales growth, it has continued to rival all major
grocery chains within the private sector.
Until 1990, excluding some minor attacks from few
congressional privatization advocates, the commissary system
faced only the private sector as its major adversary.
However, after 1990, the commissary system began to face new
challenges. The crumbling of the Berlin Wall not only brought
an end to the Cold War but also ended a period of expanding
Defense budgets. As national entitlements have continued to
grow, many citizens have urged Congress to allocate more
funding to domestic spending than to defense. A national
vigor has emerged to find new alternatives to reduce Defense
operations. This new vigor was similar to the Reagan
Administration's attempt toward reducing overall government,
but is now only focused on Defense.
B. PRIVATIZATION METHODS
Over many economic cycles, it has become common for
commercial prof it -oriented organizations to employ various
means of cost reduction in order to maintain profit margins
during economic downturns or recessions. In the past,
organizations would simply reduce general overhead expenses in
order to control overall costs and maintain existing profit
levels. Slashing general overhead expenses was a traditional
means of cutting costs without reducing production capacity.
This last economic downturn saw a new twist to this cost
cutting approach through increased use of "outsourcing."
Outsourcing simply involves the review of internal
operations or functions to determine if there are any
operations that can be performed more efficiently by an
outside company. One area that makes outsourcing different
from past cost cutting methods is that it is not confined to
general administrative areas. The current movement involves
reviewing all functional areas, including production, to
determine which goods and services should continue to be
provided from in-house efforts and which should be procured
from outside sources. All work outputs from administrative
processes, facility maintenance and various subcomponent
production are all tested for in-house efficiency through
comparison to outside sources. Within the private sector
outsourcing is acknowledged to be an effective means of
reducing costs. The public sector's equivalent to outsourcing
is "privatization.
"
The term "privatization" represents any government act
that introduces market forces to better utilize resources.
Specifically, it can be applied to any transfer of government
produced goods and services from the public sector to the
private sector. [Ref. 1] Privatization advocates
contend that the most efficient production of government goods
and services occurs through the free market system. There
exists numerous studies to support this claim. Economic
theory has documented the inefficiencies that are inherent
with government free market interventions. Adding to
government inefficiency is the weak owner-agent relationship
that is associated with government employees. [Ref. 2]
Privatization initiatives can be administered through
various methods. Simple government acts such as deregulation
and the implementation of user fees are considered
privatization acts since they increase competition within the
free market. Deregulation is a privatization initiative that
allows prices to be set through the normal interaction of
supply and demand forces. User fees reduce government
subsidies and the free-rider condition by requiring
benefactors to remit full or partial payment for government
supplied goods or services. Other forms of privatization
include sale of assets, contracting out, and the use of
vouchers. Within the realm of privatization there exists many
hybrid forms that incorporate partial use of one or more of
these main forms. [Ref. 3]
The following privatization methods can be applied to
military commissaries: user fees, contracting out, and
vouchers or direct provisioning. User fees are already being
applied in the form of surcharges and are currently five
percent of each customer's total purchase. During the 1980' s,
both the Privatization Task Force of the President's Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace Commission) and the
President's Commission on Privatization recommended the
contracting out of commissary operations in the Continental
United States (CONUS) [Ref . 4] . Only CONUS operations
were recommended since it was felt that domestic grocery
companies would either be incapable or unwilling to operate at
foreign military locations.
By 1989, the contracting out of commissary operations had
been strongly opposed by the Department of Defense (DOD)
.
Congress supported DOD on this point although it was still
clearly intent on reducing appropriated funds to support
commissaries. The third option of providing commissary
benefits through direct provisioning had yet to receive much
attention.
C. ANOTHER POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
During the 1980 's there was an effort from the commercial
grocery industry to induce Congress to restrict commissary
operations in CONUS. The grocery industry wanted Congress to
either contract out management of the retail stores or
restrict patronage to only active duty military personnel. In
response to these privatization challenges, the Fiscal Year
1989 National Defense Authorization Act contained a
prohibition against privatization, in particular, the
contracting out of military commissaries.
Those early privatization challenges along with dwindling
budgetary resources led to an independent DOD study of the
commissary system. This study became known as the Jones
Commission. It was intended to improve the commissary system
by providing the most efficient organization while reducing
its dependence on appropriated funds. Since the contracting
out option had been prohibited by the Authorization Act, the
only remaining privatization method was direct provisioning or
direct cash compensation.
The Jones Commission made numerous recommendations for
cost savings and customer service improvement. It also
concluded that direct cash compensation in lieu of commissary
privileges was a more costly alternative. The study estimated
that the benefit provided an average annual savings of $1,218
per service member. It estimated aggregate savings for CONUS
married members to be $884.85 million ($1,218 x 726,476).
This greatly exceeded the Fiscal Year 1988 CONUS portion of
commissary appropriated funds of $477.5 million. The
Commission contended that based on the military's married
population alone direct cash payments appeared to be
prohibitive. [Ref. 5]
In 1994, the DOD's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation indicated that the active duty customer's average
annual savings was less than $500. Today the government
contributes about $1.1 billion per year to run the commissary
system. This lower savings estimate when multiplied by a
planned drawdown total force strength of approximately 1.4
million members (approximately 2/3 of the 1988 force) produces
a much lower active duty benefit value comparison of $700
million. Based on these lower figures the direct cash
compensation option appears to be a possible cost saving
alternative. [Ref. 6] [Ref. 7]
The profile of commissary beneficiaries has changed over
the last twenty years and will continue to change over the
next decade. This changing situation may suddenly make direct
compensation a more efficient means of providing this benefit.
Major factors that may possibly contribute to this situation
include: shrinking family sizes, a smaller retiree population,
and a much reduced active force [Ref. 8]
.
In addition, there will be less commissary support due to
system consolidation and the negative disruption caused by the
closing of facilities as a result of the Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) process. With direct cash compensation active
duty beneficiaries will retain the same income benefit but
will have the choice of shopping at larger, more convenient,
newer superstores within the local community. The direct cash
compensation method would provide equal universal provisioning
of the benefit which does not occur under the present system.
Also, it may enhance the recognition of this benefit by making
it easier to measure.
D. AREA OF RESEARCH
This thesis will investigate the possible privatization
of the commissary system focusing on direct cash compensation
in lieu of commissary privileges. It will review the nature
of the commissary benefit including its history, intended
purpose, and some understanding of its current beneficiaries.
This research will attempt to identify any cost savings that
have been identified from past studies. A cost comparison
will be provided to determine if cash compensation in lieu of
the commissary privilege is feasible.
The analysis will be limited to only CONUS commissaries.
The reason for this limitation is due to the availability of
data and the researcher's lack of experience with the
remoteness of various overseas locations and negative aspects
this alternative might present. Time and financial resources
limit a more comprehensive study to this subject.
During this study the following research questions will
be answered:




Do commissary beneficiaries have a legal right to
these benefits?
3. What is the value of the commissary benefit?
4. Can this benefit be provided more efficiently through
direct cash compensation or other means?
E.
METHODOLOGY
The first step of the research was to identify a topic
area. A dialectical approach was taken after studying various
Defense privatization initiatives. The initiatives centered
around various support functions including the major funding
areas of personnel, logistics and maintenance support. Within
the realm of personnel support the two significant areas for
considering current privatization were housing and commissary
support. Thus, commissary support was selected as a research
topic
.
It was conjectured that perhaps one of the various
privatization methods could be utilized to provide commissary
benefits in a more cost-effective manner. This led to the
isolation of the objective research question pertaining to
direct cash compensation in lieu of commissary privileges.
The research was primarily performed in an inductive mode
employing two research strategies. The primary strategy
consisted of a archival review that concentrated on both
primary and secondary domains. The formal technique of
content analysis was used to retrieve data from these sources.
An opinion strategy was used to a much lesser extent and was
limited to gathering non-statistical data on beneficiary
sentiments towards this thesis. The domain consisted of
individuals and the technique used for data collection was
informal personal interview. These two strategies presented




This thesis is organized into five chapters. This
chapter provided some introductory information in order to
identify the research problem, its limitations
,
and the scope
and objective for the thesis. Chapter II explores the
background of the commissary system including its history and
intended purpose. It also describes post World War II
developments that have challenged the commissary system. It
also provides a discussion of past studies and their attempts
toward improving the efficiency of the commissary system.
Finally, Chapter II identifies present and possible future
issues that may lead to continued change in the commissary
system.
Chapter III identifies all the data sources used for this
thesis and the means used to collect the data. It also
introduces the methodology used to measure the value of the
commissary benefit and the process used to make program cost
comparisons
.
Chapter IV presents and analyzes the data. It provides
a discussion on the legal right to commissary benefits. It
also provides benefit value comparisons in order to determine
the feasibility of the direct cash compensation alternative.
Chapter V provides an overall summary and conclusions.
It also offers recommendations and suggestions for further




This chapter provides background information on the
commissary system. The purpose of this information is to
illustrate the evolutionary process of this system and to
identify its intended purpose. The commissary system as
referred to in this section and throughout the remainder of
this thesis will refer only to the grocery store system and
its supporting infrastructure. This thesis will not provide
a complete chronological review on all the issues involved
with the feeding of troops. Instead, it will provide only a
simplified historical overview with emphasize on key events as
they pertain to the commissary system. More specific details
on military subsistence (feeding of troops) can be found in
the referenced material. The commissary privilege was
originally considered a compensatory fringe benefit. Thus,
some military compensation history is interspersed throughout
this chapter. Highlights from past studies are examined in
order to demonstrate the visibility of this benefit as a
periodic budget- cutting target. It will also present past
attempts toward improving system efficiency. Finally, some
present-day issues are introduced to demonstrate future
budgetary issues that may continue to challenge the commissary
system.
B. HISTORY
The existence of commissaries in the military date back
to 1867. They originated when military installations were
located in the frontier wilderness. Military members have
since viewed the benefit as an "implied contract." The
earliest reference to the service is an Appropriation Act of
1866. This act authorized the Subsistence Department of the
Army to sell articles at cost prices to both officer and
enlisted personnel starting 1 July 1867. [Ref. 9]
Ever since armed forces were first assembled, governments
around the world have historically found it necessary to
house, feed and provide essential services in order to develop
and maintain an effective fighting force. For centuries
governments have furnished subsistence to members of its armed
forces either directly or indirectly. The requirement to
provide subsistence to military forces is an item that has
never been questioned. However, the method of provision has
always been a major logistical concern for many military
leaders. [Ref. 10]
In July 1775, General Washington requested Congress to
appoint the first Commissary General of the Army
[Ref. 11] . This event has led much of the literature
to suggest that the commissary system started during the
Revolutionary War. In reality, this was the start of the
Army's troop subsistence system [Ref. 12] . The
retail commissary system with its commercial type grocery
stores grew from the Army's subsistence system. Today's
commissary command, the Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) , even
traces its heritage back to the creation of the Commissary
General's Office. However, the agency admits that the
Commissary General was not involved in the sale of foodstuffs.
[Ref. 13]
The confusion associated with commissary establishment
dates is due to the Army's early commissary system performing
only a subsistence function. Due to evolutionary changes
during the late 1700 's and throughout most of the 1800' s, the
grocery store operation emerged from the subsistence system as
another means of provisioning food stores to feed the troops.
The commissary retail system started with the Army and then
later spread to the other services. The purchase of
subsistence items directly from the subsistence department was
at first a privilege reserved for the officer corps and then
later extended to enlisted personnel.
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The daily "ration" or portion of subsistence has always
been approved by congressional act and has always been
measured in monetary terms to facilitate the budgetary process
[Ref . 14] . Since it has to be increased by
congressional act, rations have never kept pace with the
times. Sometimes in the past they were purposely not
increased due to budgetary constraints. This meant that the
existing real value of rations would be reduced by inflation.
This became an inherent problem throughout U.S. history.
Soldiers drew a physical ration as measured by its
monetary equivalency. The first rations that were authorized
by congress to be drawn by the revolutionary soldier were as
follows
:
Beef, pork or fish 4.5 cents
Bread or flour 1.0 cent
Peas and beans 1 . cent
Milk 1.0 cent
Beer 1 . cent
This system exists even today. Military personnel drawing
government rations are fed at a daily monetary subsistence
rate which is intended to provide one person with three meals
per day. [Ref. 15]
With the inception of the Continental Army in 1775 until
the early 1900 's it has been difficult for the U.S. Government
to provide full authorized rations for its soldiers. Prices
in 1780 were twenty times that of 1774. Foodstuffs were
scarce and when available were very expensive. Often, troops
had to fend for themselves by using their basic pay to
purchase food from traveling peddlers or by depending on food
donations from nearby communities. Rampant inflation caused
by too much Continental Currency led to profiteering by the
peddlers. Soldiers usually went hungry which seriously
impacted morale and readiness. This caused the Army to seek
a remedy. [Ref. 16]
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Because ration items were frequently out of stock, Army
policy was changed to allow cash payments for unavailable
items in the basic ration. This monetary exchange or
commutation of rations was not by the member's choice and was
based solely on existing inventories. Members were now
guaranteed the value of their authorized ration even if
physical inventories were not immediately available. This
change also meant that members no longer had to use their base
pay to purchase rations. [Ref. 17]
The troops often preferred commuted rations over physical
or "in-kind" rations because it allowed members the basic
freedom of choice. For example, if members did not want their
beer ration they could convert the commuted monetary portion
to buy more meat. Without commuted rations members were left
to informally barter away their individual undesired ration
portions for more desperately needed items. Even today most
service members prefer cash allowances to in-kind
compensation. [Ref. 18]
Officers of the time received monetary rations according
to grade in multiples of a standard ration varying from two
rations for the lowest grades to fifteen for general officers
[Ref. 19] . However, as the Army started to expand
westward into extreme remote areas, there were fewer traders
to provide supplemental ration support. In 1826, in order to
remedy this situation Congress authorized the sale of
government food and other items at cost to officers stationed
at locations remote from markets where groceries could not be
purchased at reasonable prices [Ref. 20].
In 1835, there were 100 military posts with Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas being the westernmost post. Of the 100
military posts only 21 were on the frontier and considered
truly remote. In 1841, Army policy was changed again so that
officers could purchase provisions from the subsistence system
for themselves and their families. Since there were no limits
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on the amount that could be purchased most officers were
already making purchases for their families. This change in
the regulations simply formalized an already existing
practice. Enlisted personnel were still required to draw in-
kind rations. [Ref. 21]
The variety of items stocked by the subsistence system
increased dramatically. This was due directly to the officers
privilege to purchase directly from the Subsistence
Department. During the Civil War years stock range and levels
continued to grow due to purposely ignored or liberally
interpreted regulations. However, similar to previous wars,
various ration items did experience some short supply. Rather
than permit overall inventory levels to become critical, the
subsistence system allowed vendors to make substitutions for
unavailable ration items, i.e. hams could be substituted for
bacon. Eventually both replacement and original ration items
were being stocked. [Ref. 22]
A year after the Civil War ended Congress authorized
enlisted men the same subsistence privileges enjoyed by
officers, but only at remote posts. More troops were needed
at frontier posts in order to provide protection to the
increasing number of settlers. It was hoped that subsistence
privileges would help attract sufficient numbers of enlisted
men to these remote western posts [Ref. 23] . In
1866, the War Department issued a general order to the
Subsistence Department to sell articles of subsistence to
military members at remote locations. A location was
considered remote if it was inaccessible to local markets and
groceries could not be purchased at reasonable prices.
In 1867, the Army started establishing commissary retail
(grocery) stores, which were similar to general stores of the
period. The early stores had limited operating hours and
their range of inventory was between 200-300 items
[Ref. 24]. "Remote from markets" and "inability to
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purchase groceries at reasonable prices" were given liberal
interpretations. These "liberal interpretations" led to the
first commissary retail store to be built at Fort Delaware,
Delaware City, Delaware - far away from the frontier.
[Ref. 25]
The Army continued to add to its commissary system
throughout the remainder of the 19th century. However, it was
during the first half of the 20th century that commissary
stores began to open for the other military services. The
Marine Corps opened its first store in 1909. The Navy
followed the next year with its first store opening at the
Washington Naval Shipyard, Washington ,D.C.
[Ref. 26] . During the mobilization for World Wars I
and II commissary stores grew in consonance with the
construction of new military installations. In 1943,
dependents were allowed shopping privileges when their
sponsors were away at war. These privileges were continued
after the war and in 1945 the range of stocked items was
expanded to include perishable subsistence. Prior to this,
the stores only carried dry and canned goods. By the end of
World War II, the military commissary system was well on its
way to becoming a major grocery chain. [Ref. 27]
C. POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS
Commissary benefits are unlike other pay elements in that
they began as a privilege, were adopted as a means of
operational support, and then later became institutionalized
as an income benefit. The history of the commissary system
demonstrates how privileges can become institutionalized for
members of the military service. In fact, today many of the
benefits and privileges received on active duty are carried as
entitlements into retirement. [Ref. 28]
Changes to the military pay system can occur only through
congressional act. This has led to the institutionalism of
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military pay elements. Specifically, items of pay established
as temporary measures many times became permanent. Since the
Revolutionary War until the present, military pay would remain
static until either its procedures or levels became obviously
inadequate. Although there were incremental pay changes
between war periods most of the major revisions to the
military pay system occurred following major wars. It was
during these times that new pay concepts would be developed in
order to provide a system that would be more contemporary.
Following World War II this practice of conducting major
military pay reviews was embodied in the Career Compensation
Act of 1949. This act was similar to previous postwar
inflationary remedies and produced the same military pay and
allowance system that is still in use today
[Ref . 29] . One of the by-products of this
legislation was that it also required the Department of
Defense (DOD) to draft regulations regarding establishment
criteria for commissary stores. The intent of this criteria
was to establish justification for future stores. It was also
developed to ensure that the system' s growth would remain in
check and not expand and compete with commercial facilities.
The Armed Services Commissary Regulations submitted to
the House Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed
Services in 1949 indicated that commissary stores would not be
authorized in areas with adequate commercial facilities.
[Ref. 30] These Regulations, drafted by DOD, were
based on convenience, price and adequacy as follows:
1. Convenience - based on nonexistence of a commercial
store within ten miles of a military installation.
2. Price - unreasonableness existed when commercial
prices were twenty percent higher than commissary
store prices.
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3 . Adequacy - based on commercial store inventories being
insufficient as compared to those items carried in
commissary stores
.
The adequacy standard mainly applied to overseas locations.
[Ref. 31]
The new commissary regulations were never used to
eliminate justification for existing commissaries but were
mainly used to justify the establishment of new stores.
Congress, however, seemed determined to reduce commissary
appropriation support and intended to reemphasize its
commitment. In 1952, Congress decided to make commissaries
more self-sufficient by passing on certain operating costs to
its customers through the use of a surcharge. A surcharge had
not been imposed on the commissary system since a 10%
surcharge was enacted in 1879. It was designed to defray the
increase in system costs for spoilage, transportation and
other incidentals. In 1884 the surcharge was repealed because
improved rail support eliminated its need. [Ref. 32]
[Ref. 33]
The surcharges imposed in 1952 were intended to cover
costs in purchasing and maintaining operational equipment and
supplies, second transportation of goods, and to pay for
utilities in CONUS . Secondary transportation of goods deals
with the movement of inventory from a central warehouse to
ultimate store locations. Surcharge rates were applied to
total customer purchases and ranged from l%-2% depending on
individual service commissary system. The rationale for
surcharges was that the 1949 Compensation Act had restored
military pay to a comparable civilian compensation standard
and that any further income effect was not necessary. Also,
it was believed that savings from closed commissary stores
could produce an offset to help finance the new pay and
allowance system. [Ref. 34]
An additional requirement was imposed the following year
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when Congress required annual justification certification for
existing commissary stores. By 1953, the number of
commissaries established in CONUS by the four services had
grown to 210 stores. To continue operating commissaries in
CONUS the Secretary of Defense was required by law to certify
the requirement for existing commissaries and was directed to
close those stores that no longer met the justification
criteria. Many in Congress felt that justification for
continued commissary support was questionable since most
military installations were located near large metropolitan
areas. [Ref. 35]
By the 1960's, the value of commissaries became a key
issue for sustaining recruitment, retention and overall
personnel readiness goals. Prior to 1967, the military
considered the commissary fringe benefit as a factor in
determining pay raises. In 1967, the First Quadrennial Review
of Military Compensation (QRMC) recognized the benefit as no
longer an appropriate element of compensation because it
provided unequal benefits to military personnel. It was also
considered an impractical obligation on the part of the
Government to guarantee commissary benefits. The QRMC stated
that the value of the benefit depended on family size, income
level, access to commissaries and family consumption patterns.
If the benefit was considered an element of compensation then
DOD would be placed in a position of paying cash to military
members who did not have access to a commissary.
[Ref. 36]
The First QRMC also recommended that military
compensation be tied to Federal Civilian wages. To do this
there had to be a set "basic" rate used to value military
compensation. The figure used for this was Regular Military
Compensation or RMC which included base pay and allowances for
subsistence and quarters. This rate would be computed and
compared to predetermined equivalency points for the
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government's civilian employee General Schedule (GS) and the
military's pay tables. The General Schedule is periodically
updated to reflect the latest standard of compensation based
on a private sector comparison. This creates an often cited
argument that if military compensation is comparable to
civilian pay then how can the need for commissaries be
justified. This same sentiment has continued to fuel support
for commissary self-sufficiency.
In 1969, a study by the Logistics Management Institute
was conducted at the direction of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. It recommended that the CONUS commissary retail
system should be self-sufficient. This means that government
subsidies would be discontinued except for overseas locations
and contingency operations. It further recommended that
commissaries should be merged with exchanges and operated in
a similar fashion, that is, without direct appropriation
support. (The military exchange system does receive some
minor indirect support.) It was believed that through added
economies food prices could remain at 5% above cost and the
nonfood items could be sold at the higher exchange prices.
From a taxpayer perspective this combined system would be more
cost-effective and could still provide an adequate economic
benefit estimated to be between 10%- 12%. [Ref. 37]
In 1973, Congress decided to establish a plan to raise
surcharges over the next few years until the commissary system
was completely self-sufficient. The Fiscal Year 1974 DOD
Appropriation Bill increased commissary surcharges to 3% and
called for subsequent increases in 1976 and 1978
[Ref. 38] . Congress believed that commissaries
provided a convenience similar to base exchanges. However,
they were not convinced on the disadvantage of price since
commercial grocery stores were being used by the general
public with no complaints of unreasonable price.
Following the intent of Congress, the Pentagon's
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budgetary process for the Fiscal Year 1975 budget submission
included a program budget decision that proposed elimination
of appropriation funding for the commissary system. Program
Budget Decision 282 called for the substitution of surcharge
funds in lieu of appropriated funds for certain operating
costs. These system costs included those for military and
civilian employees and utility costs for overseas locations.
(Utility costs for CONUS activities were already being
reimbursed with surcharge funds.) However, overseas
transportation costs would continue to be covered by
appropriated funds. This policy would be implemented on 1
October 1975 and was scheduled to be phased over a two year
period. [Ref. 39]
The budget decision also called for a major comprehensive
study of the commissary system. The primary purpose of this
study was to recommend ways to improve overall system
efficiency. It was believed that through greater efficiency
the current commissary system could preserve customer savings
while meeting mandated appropriated fund reimbursements. As
will be seen, this study was only the first of many studies to
occur over the next twenty years.
D. RECENT STUDIES
As was stated in Chapter I, privatization is any
government action that reduces government influence and
increases market forces of supply and demand. Privatization
of the commissary system began with the introduction of
surcharges in 1952. The commissary system has been an annual
budgetary target and will continue to be so until the system
becomes self-sufficient or is eliminated. The use of studies
has been an instrument employed by both the Pentagon and
Congress to either defend or attack the commissary system.
The commissary system became seriously threatened when
the First QRMC indicated that the commissary benefit should no
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longer be considered as part of compensation. Further damage
was inflicted when the Logistics Management Institute
recommended discontinuance of the government subsidy. A final
blow came from the 1974 DOD Appropriation Bill that presented
a plan for complete self-sufficiency. In 1975, the Bowers
Commission was created in part as a defense against these
continued attempts towards reducing the commissary system.
The Bowers Commission produced four alternatives to the
current system:
1. Create centralized service-wide management
organizations to operate individual service commissary
stores
.
2. Merge commissaries with exchanges.
3. Establish a joint service commissary agency to operate
all DOD commissary stores.
4. Operate commissaries under a Government -owned,
Contractor- operated (GOCO) system.
Of the four alternatives the Commission recommended
alternative three. [Ref. 40]
No action was taken on the recommendations from the
Bowers Commission and in 1976 the surcharge was increased to
4%. The 1974, DOD Appropriation Bill called for another
surcharge increase in 1978. but it was never imposed.
[Ref. 41]
In 1980, the General Accounting Office (GAO) performed an
independent analysis of the commissary system. The purpose
for this analysis was to review system justification,
appropriated support and overall management. The following
recommendations represent its major points:
1. Determine if there is a need for commissary benefits
and provide data to support this need. Also,
alternative programs should be identified to meet this
need and then analyzed for cost-effectiveness.
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2. Justification criteria should be made realistic and a





The four separate commissary systems should be
consolidated into one single agency.
4. Congress should enact specific legislation identifying
redefined operating conditions and then require self-
sustaining operation of any stores not meeting the new
criteria
.
Comments made by DOD indicated that the report did not
recognize the evolutionary changes in the commissary system.
It also did not consider the quality of life that the stores
maintain and the offset provided for lower pay and the demands
of military life. In response to DOD comments, GAO countered
that any justification based on insufficient pay should be
dealt with as a separate pay matter and any other arguments
for commissary justification should be supported with adequate
data. [Ref. 42]
The early 1980 's introduced some of the largest pay
raises ever seen by the modern force. These pay raises
indirectly led to another surcharge increase in 1983 which
brought the surcharge rate to 5%. In a short period of ten
years the surcharge rate had more than doubled. The
commissary lost some influence as an income inflator due to
the surcharge increases and it also experienced new challenges
from growing privatization groups.
In 1983 the Privatization Task Force of the President's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, known as the Grace
Commission, received a charter to identify privatization
measures for the government. Among other recommendations for
government savings the Grace Commission recommended
privatization of the commissary system. The Commission
estimated that approximately $2.4 billion could be saved over
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three years through the sale of commissary stores. A later
separate analysis by the GAO stated that the savings were
overestimated and that $1 billion was more realistic.
[Ref. 43]
In 1987, a presidential executive order was issued to
establish a President's Commission on Privatization. The
Commission's report indicated that there were some 240 stores
in CONUS competing with local retailers. Since there were
adequate commercial retail grocery stores in CONUS, the
Commission concluded that greater efficiencies could be
achieved through private sector participation with the
contracting out of commissary operations.
In response to continued privatization pressures from the
commercial grocery industry, the Chairman of the Morale,
Welfare and Recreation Panel, Subcommittee on Readiness, of
the House Committee on Armed Services, requested DOD to
conduct a comprehensive study of the commissary system. To
provide temporary relief from privatization forces, the Fiscal
Year 1989 Defense Authorization Bill prohibited privatization
of military commissaries. This congressional request
established the last major study of the commissary system
called the Jones Commission. The Jones Commission mandate was
similar to the Bowers Commission conducted fourteen years
earlier. Again, DOD was searching for recommendations to
provide increased efficiencies in order to reduce dependence
on appropriation funds. Although the Jones Commission
produced more recommendations then the Bowers Commission it
echoed a similar theme of a consolidated commissary system
headed by a centralized DOD agency.
Until World War II, the commissary system kept pace with
the rest of the military establishment expanding at every
opportunity. Through the last four decades the commissary
system has faced a series of challenges designed to either
reduce its size or eliminate it altogether. These actions
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make it clear that the trend of growth established by the
commissary system in the first half of the century could not
continue through the second half. These challenges exist even
today and have apparently been successful since the commissary
system has dwindled from 258 CONUS stores in 1990 to 214 in
1994 [Ref . 44] .
Over the years Congress has been steadfast in providing
continued support for the commissary system by continually
granting appropriated fund support. The economic benefit
produced by the commissary system, if terminated, would have
the same effect as reducing military pay. The underlying
issue is whether there remains a more cost-effective means of
providing this highly valued economic benefit.
E. FUTURE ISSUES
Today the military commissary benefit is viewed as an
essential entitlement. Existing survey data has repeatedly
revealed that active duty personnel value this noncash
economic benefit as second only to medical benefits. The
importance and commitment of the military services is best
illustrated by frequent supportive statements made by recent
Defense Secretaries. They have repeatedly offered strong
resistance to studies recommending changes to the commissary
system.
As a result of the Jones Commission findings, the Defense
Commissary Agency (DECA) was formed on 1 October 1991 to
provide centralized management of all DOD commissary
operations. One of the main issues that the newly formed
agency had to deal with was the effects of the military
downsizing. The decision of Base Closure and Realignment
Commission (BRAC) to close 129 domestic facilities and the
realignment of 46 others presents a patron base that will be
reduced and relocated. Some commissaries will close and
others will either become underutilized or overcrowded. In
23
addition, the Clinton administration is seeking a final force
drawdown figure of 1.2 million which is 200,000 less than the
Bush administration. This compares to an active duty force
that was approximately 2.0 million in 1990. [Ref. 45]
The problem that this situation creates is that a
diminishing customer base will lead to reduced sales. As
stated earlier the system is now partially self-sufficient due
to surcharge revenues that are generated by the 5% surcharge
on total sales. If sales decline, then surcharge revenues
will also dwindle requiring either higher appropriated fund
support or higher surcharge rates. Congress is less inclined
to increase appropriated support because of its unwavering
intent on reducing the defense budget. This will almost
certainly lead to higher surcharges which will reduce the
member's economic benefit.
One immediate response to this dilemma is to again seek
out system efficiencies to offset the loss in surcharge
revenue due to reduced sales. The initial predicted savings
of $132.8 million in annual savings has already been
surpassed. In a statement prepared by the head of DECA to the
House Armed Services Morale, Welfare and Recreation Panel on
15 March 1994 it was reported that the actual annual savings
from system consolidation was currently at $144 million. This
increased savings will ease the situation somewhat but may not
entirely offset future lost surcharge revenues from shrinking
sales
.
In 1994, while reviewing this situation the Pentagon
drafted a proposal that was included in a report by the DOD
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The proposal
explained the lost revenues paradox and recommended raising
the surcharge rate by one percentage point each year until it
reached 10% to 15%. The proposal surfaced as part of the
Fiscal Year 1996 budget review process. This increase in
surcharge would eliminate the commissary's need for
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appropriated funds allowing the Pentagon to program these
funds towards other requirements. At approximately $1.1
billion per year, reducing support for commissary operations
would help preserve other needed line items within the DOD
budget. [Ref. 46]
Also in 1994, the GAO identified a list of 43 possible
commissary stores that were considered to be outstanding
candidates for conversion into self-supporting, exchange- run
grocery stores. This would make commissaries similar to the
exchange managed convenience stores sometimes referred to as
"MiniMart". This plan was modeled after the current test
program in place at Carswell Air Force Base in Texas. The
test program was directed by Xongress in 1993. Under this
system all nonfood items are marked up to match normal
exchange profit levels while food items are just slightly
higher in order to meet higher exchange overhead costs. The
5% commissary surcharge is based on government subsidies and
is insufficient to meet the exchanges higher overhead rate.
The report also recommended closing 26 other commissaries
because they were within 25 miles of another commissary. The
GAO report indicates that self-sufficiency advocates have not
disappeared and are likely to continue as future adversaries
to the commissary system. [Ref. 47]
As long as there is a budgetary process it appears there
will be competing items within the budget to rival commissary
appropriation support. The main issues of downsizing, the
closing of military bases, and future changes in the military
personnel profile will undoubtedly have negative effects on
the commissary system. In anticipation of these future
changes this thesis will attempt to identify a better, more
cost-effective means of provisioning the economic compensatory
benefit provided by the commissary system.
In summary, this chapter provided some background
information on the commissary system. It also included some
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history on military pay in order to gain a full understanding
of the evolutionary process of the commissary fringe benefit
as part of the overall compensation system. While the system
continued to grow during the first half of this century it
seemed evident that forces would eventually emerge to counter
its growth. These self-sufficiency forces that developed
during the last half of this century will probably continue
into to increase into the next. The pressures that these
forces bear on DOD's budget will probably not subside until
the commissary system is either eliminated or no longer





The focus will now shift from the commissary system as
described in Chapter II to the commissary benefit - the
economic value that the system produces. In order to
determine if direct cash compensation is more cost-effective,
a cost comparison will have to be established between the
current system and the proposed alternative. Prior to making
a cost comparison, a benefit value will have to be
established. This will entail a bifurcated process in which
both aggregate and apportioned values will need to be
determined. Calculating the aggregate value should be a
facile task but attempting to measure an apportioned value
will definitely lead to some complexity. The rationale for
this is that the benefit provides unequal value to its
beneficiaries. The value of the benefit is dependent on such
variables as family size, income level, consumption patterns,
frequency, and access to commissaries. This led the First
QRMC to conclude that the commissary benefit should no longer
be an element of compensation.
Despite this significant challenge, accepted methods are
available to produce reasonable estimates. In addition to
dealing with the value measurement issue, this chapter will
also identify the various data sources used in this thesis and
the means used to accumulate the data.
B. INFORMATION SOURCES
The background literary information for this thesis
emanated from three major archives. The first source
investigated was the Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC) and the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE)
.
The second source was the Naval Postgraduate School
Dudley Knox Library which also included the "Air University
Index to Military Periodicals" and the "Business Periodicals
27
Index." The last major source was the General Accounting
Office's (GAO) reports database.
All the information sources had automated databases that
greatly facilitated the data search process. Altogether the
above sources produced data search listings that accumulated
over 500 possible sources. These listings were examined and
reduced to about 45 references that were actually used to
develop the theory, background information, and methodology
for this thesis.
The Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) provided some
additional background information and provided some current
operations data. The military demographic statistical data
was provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
through copies of "Selected Manpower Statistics." "Selected
Manpower Statistics" is an annual publication distributed by
DOD's Directorate for Information Operations and Reports
(DIOR). Lastly, DOD's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation provided some political insight on direct cash
compensation theory. It also identified some criteria that
would have to be met for direct cash compensation to be a
viable alternative.
C. METHOD OF COLLECTION
The primary method of data collection was an extensive
archival investigation. This investigation uncovered various
literature and documentation to facilitate an examination of
both past and present research efforts. The investigative
effort originally encompassed two primary subject areas and
later involved a third supplemental area.
The first subject area disclosed data concerned with
government privatization. This provided an in-depth
understanding of concepts, current methods, and ideal
conditions for successful implementation. The second subject
area centered on the commissary system. This data consisted
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of historical literature and past research studies, mainly the
Bowers and Jones Commissions, conducted to improve the
commissary system.
Supplemental research was conducted on the military
compensation system. This was done to understand the
commissary as a fringe benefit and its relationship to the
overall pay system. The major studies reviewed during this
process included the First, Fifth, and Seventh QRMC studies.
These compensation studies are conducted every four years
starting with the First QRMC in 1967. The First QRMC was an
initial attempt at establishing military pay concepts. The
Fifth QRMC provided a comprehensive review of the military
retirement system in 1984. The Seventh QRMC was the most
recent study of military compensation conducted in 1992.
These studies provided the evolutionary background for the
military compensation system and the rationale used to develop
and justify various compensatory benefits including
commissaries .
A secondary method of data collection came from informal
interviews with selected personal contacts and by telephone
conversations with DOD's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation and DECA. Information provided by agency sources
was first confirmed by external literary sources before being
used in this research. This method, although tedious, was
performed mainly to minimize agency bias. Personal contact
was made with DMDC to collect data on military demographics.
Lastly, general population data used for demographic
comparisons was retrieved from the 1993 "Statistical Abstract
of the United States" published by the Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census.
D. SURVEY DATA
The data collection process uncovered numerous studies
and surveys performed to measure commissary savings rates, to
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evaluate user preferences and antipathies, and to provide a
basis for continued commissary justification. Unfortunately,
there was little data collected to categorize the customer
base, determine customer frequency, or measure customer
commissary expenditures in relation to total food
expenditures. This was unanticipated due to the number of
studies and surveys that were collected.
Despite the lack of customer base data, there was
sufficient data to make adequate estimates to conclude direct
cash compensation feasibility. Alternate forms of data
existed to provide sufficient means for conducting a benefit
value comparison. For customer base breakdown, DECA estimates
that commissary usage is approximately 46% active duty, 49%
retirees and 5% other. The other category consists of
reserves, surviving spouses, certain government employees, and
other authorized shoppers [Ref . 48] . To provide
simplicity the customer base will be assumed to be comprised
of mainly active duty and retirees.
Many studies have been performed to compute the savings
provided by the commissary system. Varying results have been
produced that suggest locality and market basket elements as
possible factors for different survey outcomes. Specifically,
market basket elements consisting of national brand items
present a basis for survey bias. Most commercial grocery
chains carry generic or store brand items. The commissary
system only carries mainly national name brand items. Since
most military families are on tight budgets they would be more
inclined to purchase generic brands rather than the national
brands. This would attribute to higher survey results for
commissary savings
.
Studies on commissary savings have been performed on
various individual commissary stores. These studies were all
performed in the same manner. They involved total sales cost
comparisons between at least two major grocery chain stores
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from the nearby community and the installation commissary
store. First, a representative market basket or grocery list
was selected. Next, a total sales cost including sales tax
was computed based on labeled shelf prices. Then the totals
were compared and a percentage price difference was
calculated. The results, labeled as local commissary savings
percentages ranged from 19% to 30%. Nationally conducted
surveys performed by DECA indicate the savings range between
20% and 30%, depending on locality. DECA's advertised average
savings for the commissary system is 23.4% [Ref . 49]
.
Correcting for market basket bias would reduce this estimated
savings by approximately 5% [Ref. 50] or to 18.4%.
The savings rate used for this study will be 20%. There are
two reasons for using this figure. First, is the ease that
rounding provides and second, 20% still remains as the price
criteria that was first established by DOD in 1949.
Many studies have attempted to "value" the commissary
benefit. "Value" as it pertains to these studies was mainly
the savings rate of a local commissary store. For example, if
a commissary market basket priced at $100 was compared to a
similar commercial market basket of $125 then this would
produce a price differential of $25. The benefit value would
then be 25% ($25/$100) . To eliminate any possible confusion,
this thesis will term the 25% as the store or system "savings
rate" and not as the benefit's "value."
The income effect of this benefit is then computed as a
function of the benefit savings rate. The savings rate of 25%
is multiplied by the actual expenditure to produce actual
customer savings. In a scenario where $200 is spent at the
commissary then a $40 ($200 x 25%) savings would be produced.
This $40 cost savings can be applied to other expenditures
thus creating added disposable income for the military member.
This is why any increase to the surcharge rate is so greatly
opposed by the military families.
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E. BENEFIT VALUATION
The valuation of fringe benefits can be calculated
through three different methods. First, a benefit can be
valued based on employer costs. For instance, if a company
provides a fringe benefit like health insurance it might pay
$3,000 per year per employee. The compensatory value of this
benefit from the employer's perspective is $3,000.
Second, benefit valuation can be based on actual market
costs. Through economic packaging the employer has secured a
price of $3,000 but if the employee entered the market place
on their own the cost for the same coverage might be $4,000
per year.
Finally, the last valuation method is what the employee
thinks the benefit is worth. From the employee's perspective
this fringe benefit could have zero value if the benefit is
not used or it could have a much more substantial value if
used frequently. Suppose the company offered an option of
receiving the company coverage or receiving $2,500 in cash
payment. Because some people prefer cash to in-kind benefits
they might opt to receive the cash even though it is less than
the employers' cost of $3,000. The employees electing to
receive the cash, might purchase less coverage or different
coverage to meet their own specific needs, and then pocket the
difference. Either way the value of the benefit from the
employee's perspective would be $2,500. Chapter IV will
analyze the commissary benefit using the same three method
fashion.
In summary, this chapter has identified the sources of
information, method of collection, existing data from studies
and surveys, and the methods that will be used to value the
commissary benefit. The next chapter will address the legal
right to commissary benefits, estimate a benefit value, make
a cost comparison, and determine if commuted payments are a
feasible alternative.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter will present and analyze data to determine
if direct cash payment in lieu of commissary privileges is
feasible. First, some key observations obtained from informal
interviews will be introduced. These interviews identify some
important issues and concerns that need to be addressed. The
policy of commissary benefits will be analyzed to ascertain
the legal claim to commissary benefits posed by the second
research question. Next, in response to the third research
question a benefit value will be calculated from both an
employer's perspective and then from a member's perspective.
The employer's perspective will measure the benefit value
by dividing total system costs by total beneficiaries. Then,
the member's perspective will estimate benefit value from a
usage standpoint. After benefit values are established, they
will be compared to system costs. These cost comparisons will
determine if direct cash compensation is a more cost-effective
alternative. Again, the cost comparisons will be made only
for the CONUS portion of the system. And finally, the last
research question concerning the feasibility of the direct
cash compensation alternative will be evaluated.
B. INFORMAL INTERVIEWS
Informal personal interviews were conducted with various
ranking military officers and some officer spouses. From
these different perspectives four observations seem to
summarize the main characteristics that beneficiaries
associate with commissary benefits.
The first observation is from a retired Navy Rear
Admiral. He viewed the benefit as a guaranteed right under
his retirement compensation package and if commissaries were
eliminated then a cash offset would have to be paid to retired
personnel. He indicated that his wife, who makes all
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household grocery purchases, did not shop at the commissary.
She had several reasons for not doing so. One reason was due
to the proximity of local stores. She felt it was
inconvenient to drive across town to access the commissary.
In addition, she felt the savings produced from shopping for
a two member household were inadequate to justify the added
inconvenience. Although his wife did not exercise use of the
benefit, he stated that the nonuse of the commissary was
greatly reducing the value of their retirement package.
However, he could not estimate any amount for this lost value.
The next observation is from an Army Captain and his wife
who had no children. He had almost twenty years of service
and started in the enlisted ranks. His wife became absolutely
irate at the suggestion of eliminating commissary stores. His
wife claimed that enlisted personnel would suffer hardship
without commissary benefits because, after all, many of them
were already receiving food stamps. The Army Captain was more
reserved and was curious of the proposed alternative. When
queried if an offset of $50-$75 would be fair they both
claimed that it roughly reflected their commissary savings.
In fact, his wife added that she already did quite a bit of
her shopping at the local Costco (a regional discount chain of
warehouse type wholesale stores) and would prefer to do the
rest at the local Safeway.
A Navy Lieutenant provided another opinion. He was just
recently married but still held a bachelor's viewpoint to the
Navy's compensation system. He stated that he could not
understand why married members received higher allowances. He
claimed that during a previous sea tour all the ship's
officers with the rank of Lieutenant and below who were
married had no children. Their wives also worked making their
household incomes already higher than his. In his opinion
they did not need any added income for being married and that
the commissary only tended to inflate real incomes for married
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and family households. In addition, he lived aboard a sail
boat and due to small galley space he mostly ate out and could
not capitalize on the commissary benefit. Even now that he is
married and his wife works, they share the same opinion as the
retired Rear Admiral's wife. They feel that their small
amount of shopping does not justify the inconvenience of
traveling across town to use the commissary.
The final observation came from a Navy Lieutenant
Commander's spouse. She stated that if commissaries were
eliminated the government would have to give her an added
$1,000 per month to make up for her lost commissary benefit.
She indicated that not only did the government have an
obligation to her and her husband but that her claim would be
even higher because she had two children. This absurd
rationale based on dependency status was equivalent to the
claim of a welfare recipient. The military compensation
system should not be construed as a welfare system based on
the number of dependents. However, her estimated benefit
value of $1,000 per month was the real issue of interest.
Immediately without a doubt this figure appeared to be
inflated. It was assumed that the $1,000 per month figure was
her total food budget and not an estimate of her commissary
purchases. Even with this assumption it seemed inconceivable
that a family of four could spend $12,000 a year or almost one
third of a family's total income for food. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics indicates that the national average for a
total food budget is approximately 21.56% of gross income.
The monthly gross income for a Lieutenant Commander (over 12
years servive) is about $3,500 per month (1994 pay table).
This means that their average monthly total food budget should
be approximately $755 ($3,500 x 21.56%) . When presented with
this information she agreed that perhaps her total food
purchases were about $700 per month.
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The next item of interest was what portion of her monthly
$700 total food budget was actually spent at the commissary.
Considering today's consumer -oriented food market which caters
to just about every need or desire, it would be impractical to
assume that a modern military family spends its entire food
budget at the commissary. A study performed by the U.S. Army
Research Institute (ARI) indicated that roughly 40% of a
military family's total food expenditures are made at the
commissary [Ref . 51] . This means that the above
spouse's actual amount spent at the commissary would be about
$280 per month. If the commissary expenditure is indexed for
the average system savings rate of 20% then the lost savings
would be $56 per month. Her direct cash payment would be $56
vice the $1,000 per month that was originally suggested. This
situation seems to support the phenomenon that the perceived
value of benefits multiply when elimination is suggested. The
Navy spouse acknowledged these figures as probably fair
estimates of their family food expenditures. In fact, like
the Army Captain's wife she too admitted that most of her
grocery shopping was probably done at her neighborhood Price
Club (a chain of warehouse type stores similar to Costco)
.
These informal interviews identified some basic issues
that need to be addressed if direct cash payment is to be a
viable option. The first issue was that revealed by the Rear
Admiral concerning legal claim to the benefit and the offset
that would have to be provided to the retirement community.
The next issue was the concern for enlisted personnel as
described by the Army Captain's wife. Another aspect is the
dependency pay differential and "needs based" compensation as
described by the Navy Lieutenant. And finally, a further
analysis had to be made of the major issue concerning benefit
value. An estimate had to be produced that fairly provided a
cash offset while still remaining cost-effective.
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C. ENTITLEMENT OR PRIVILEGE
The thesis will now address the second research question
which mainly concerns the legal claim to commissary benefits
perceived by its beneficiaries. If the right to commissary
benefits are a legal claim such as social security benefits or
welfare assistance then they should perhaps be considered an
entitlement. If commissary benefits are entitlements then
anyone not receiving the benefit would be entitled to an
equivalent cash payment. On the other hand, if commissary
benefits are not an entitlement, then how should they be
classified? Perhaps a compensatory fringe benefit or maybe a
privilege?
The first step will be to define each of these categories
to determine which best describes this benefit. An
entitlement is a non-compensatory government payment for which
there is legislation to support a legal claim. A fringe
benefit is a compensatory payment made by an employer that is
non-discriminatory and apportioned to all employees. Payroll
fringe benefits increase personnel costs but do not affect
basic wages or income. These benefits are good for employees
because they provide an increase in real income but are not
included as gross income and so are not taxable. Fringe
benefits are good for employers because they provide a greater
income to employees but through gained economies they are
normally less expensive then actual wages. Lastly, there are
privileges. Privileges are granted to employees at the
discretion of the employer and may or may not induce an income
benefit
.
Social security, welfare, medicare, etc. all qualify as
entitlements. Social security is different from other
entitlements because they are contributory benefits,' i.e.
workers pay into the system through social security taxes. The
federal retirement programs for civil service and military
personnel are not entitlements because they are compensatory
37
programs. These retirement programs are employer fringe
benefits because they contribute to the employer's overall
personnel costs. They provide increased compensation to the
employee without increasing current wages. Other examples of
fringe benefits would be paid holidays or health insurance.
Viewing the commissary benefit in similar fashion makes
it easy to determine that it is not an entitlement. This
means it is either a fringe benefit or a privilege. Many
beneficiaries assume it to be a fringe benefit. This
assumption is based on the fact that it is compensatory in
nature because of the cost savings generated and it is the
right of every beneficiary. The Armed Services Commissary
Regulations uses both terms to refer to commissary use. But
according to the definition of a fringe benefit it has to be
apportioned or guaranteed to all employees. Meals or rations
and housing are military fringe benefits because they are
compensatory and apportioned to all members. Those members
who are not provided with rations and housing in-kind receive
cash allowances. Commissary benefits are different from
rations and housing for two reasons. First, they are not only
offered to active duty military members (employees) but are
also offered to dependents (non- employees) . Second,
commissary benefits are not guaranteed to all beneficiaries.
For example, some personnel assigned to recruiting duty in
areas without military installations are inaccessible to
commissary benefits and are not provided with any additional
cash compensation. Similarly, retirees and reservists located
near closed bases due to downsizing are in the same situation.
The lack of cash compensation for nonaccessibility makes
the commissary benefit a privilege. It is a privilege that
can be used by entitled beneficiaries but if a commissary
store is inaccessible then there exists no legal claim against
the government. This led the First QRMC to determine that
commissary benefits should no longer be used as part of the
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compensation formula to determine pay raises. This also
addresses the issue of retiree legal claim. When retirees
leave the service they retain many of their benefits as
privileges. They have the privilege to use all base
facilities including athletic, recreational, medical and
dental clinics, and exchanges and commissaries. But if for
any reason these facilities are unable to support retirees,
there is no legal claim against the government to provide any
commuted payment. Even medical treatment is offered on a
space available basis. The retirees are prioritized after
active duty dependents for medical purposes. This means that
they can seldom get various follow-up treatment.
[Ref. 52]
During overseas assignments, both DOD and non-DOD
civilian personnel are also authorized commissary privileges.
This issue will be ignored since this study is only
considering the CONUS portion of the commissary system. The
Reserves are currently authorized 14 usage days per year (not
to include periods of active duty) . During periods of active
duty reserve personnel are authorized unlimited privileges
similar to other active duty personnel. This leaves the last
major group of beneficiaries: active duty personnel and their
dependents
.
Whether active duty personnel receive additional cash
compensation in lieu of commissary privileges would remain a
pay matter. Despite what anyone thinks there is no legal
claim to these privileges. This action would be similar to
the reduction in the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
appropriation that occurred throughout the 1980' s. Dependents
must now pay user fees to many recreational facilities that
were once free. This same reduction in funding can happen at
any time to the commissary system making surcharge rates
higher and reducing the cost savings of the system. Although
there is no legal obligation for the government to make
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commuted payments it might consider to do so or the active
duty force would be faced with a pay reduction. This
reduction in real income would in turn have a negative impact
on the active duty force's "quality of life," a continued top




Current funding for the commissary system is derived from
both surcharge revenue and Appropriated Fund Support (AFS)
.
Only AFS or taxpayer costs will be considered in making cost
comparisons. Surcharges are provided by the beneficiaries and
will not be considered as part of the cost comparison since
the 5% surcharge is already taken into account during savings
rate measurements.
Appropriated funds were approximately $1.16 billion in
Fiscal Year 1993. The Fiscal Year 1995 DOD Authorization Bill
included an additional $40 million bringing the taxpayer's
total support to $1.2 billion. Of this $1.2 billion,
approximately $576 million is estimated to be earmarked for
funding CONUS operations. The same 1995 Authorization Bill
also set a target of 1.5 million active duty personnel which
is about 85,000 fewer than Fiscal Year 1994 (FY94). The
Clinton administration currently plans to draw down the active
duty force to as few as 1.4 million by 1997. However, this
analysis will be based on FY95 figures. As stated in the
introduction to this chapter, employee benefits can be valued
from both employer and employee perspectives. Table 4.1
demonstrates the employer's perspective of valuing employee




TOTAL FY95 APPROPRIATED FUND SUPPORT $1,200 MILLION
TOTAL FY9 5 AUTHORIZED ACTIVE DUTY FORCE h- 1.5 MILLION
MEMBER'S AVERAGE ANNUAL BENEFIT VALUE $800.00
AVERAGE MONTHLY VALUE ($725.00 * 12 MONTHS) $66.67
TABLE 4-1. Member's Average Annual and Monthly Benefit Value.
The benefit will now be valued from an employee's
perspective. This perspective is based on actual usage.
Since savings are a function of income level, family size and
individual spending patterns, measuring the benefit's value
will be more involved than it would appear. Because of the
diverse individual savings rates, average savings rates were
determined for each pay grade. These average pay grade
savings rates were then multiplied by the average monthly
gross incomes to estimate actual commissary savings. Average
monthly gross incomes were determined by considering average
flow points for promotion and then averaging the base pay for
those flow points based on normal years of service. The
average base pay for each pay grade were then added to their
corresponding monthly BAQ and BAS to estimate average monthly
gross incomes. Average monthly gross incomes were multiplied
by average consumer food expenditure rates to produce average
annual and monthly commissary savings per pay grade.
Tables 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 are estimates of the average
monthly gross income for each pay grade. Basic pay, BAQ and
BAS data were transcribed from the 1994 military pay table.
The actual flow points were determined by considering













E-l <2 YEARS $832.80 $320.10 $204.00 $1,356.90













































$2,918.60 $584 .10 $204 .00 $3, 706.70


































$3, 732.15 $663 .90 $142 .46 $4, 538.51
TABLE 4-3. Warrant Officer Average Monthly Gross Income.
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AVERAGE
PAY FLOW AVERAGE MONTHLY
GRADE POINTS BASE PAY BAQ BAS GROSS INCOME


























$4,409.30 $780.30 $142 .46 $5,332.06






$5,567.00 $809 .70 $142 .46 $6,519 .16
0-7 MAXIMUM $6, 611.10 $899.10 $142 .46 $7,652.66
TABLE 4-4. Officer Average Monthly Gross Income.
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The officer average monthly gross income schedule, Table
4-4, does not include pay grades 0-8 to 0-10. There are
several reasons for this. One reason is that, as a matter of
practice, allowances for pay grades 0-7 and above (flag
officers) are equivalent. This is due to the fact that flag
officer total compensation is capped in relation to Federal
Schedule Senior Executive Service pay levels. Another factor
supporting the decision to group the flag officer pay grades
was that as a group they were statistically insignificant.
Flag officers comprise only about .05% of the active duty
force. Also, the consumer food expenditure rates do not
dramatically increase over these pay grades.
Consumer food expenditure rates are calculated by the
Census Bureau and published annually. They reflect average
amounts of gross income that are spent on housing, food and
other household items. They are produced as part of the
Consumer Expenditure Survey program which collects data in
order to annually revise the Consumer Price Index. The data
published in the 1993 "Statistical Abstract of the United
States" is segmented into various categories. The categories
include age, geographic region, household size, occupation,
and income level. Total food expenditures encompass both food
consumed at home and away from home. Food consumed at home
includes groceries purchased from commissaries and other
commercial facilities including convenience store and
warehouse type purchases.
Most people believe that household size is the strongest
variable affecting food expenditures but the data suggests
otherwise. According to the data, food expenditures are most
significantly influenced by income level. An inference that
can be drawn from the data is that as income increases, so do
food expenditures but at a slower rate. This causes
expenditure rates to decrease as income increases. Food
expenditure increases caused by increases in income level are
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gradual as compared to household size increases. Over time as
household size increases, total food expenditures increase but
at a slower rate than produced by increased income over the
same period. In other words, total food expenditures would
increase over time even if household sizes remained constant.
Food expenditures are actually a nonlinear function. For
income levels around $10,000 the average total food
expenditure rate is about 30%. As income levels approach
$20,000 they average about 19% and decline by slightly less
than 1% per $1,000 increase in income. From the $15,000 to
$25,000 gross income level the expenditure rate decreases by
about 8%. At the $40,000 to $60,000 range the rates decrease
by about .5% per $1,000 increase in income. Beyond $80,000,
expenditure rates decline by approximately .025% per $1,000.
From the $40,000 to $80,000 income level the rate decreases by
only 4.5%. In the case of flag officers, once gross income
approaches the $100,000 range the differential between food
expenditure rates becomes very small. [Ref. 53]
The data for annual gross income levels were distributed
by quintiles ranging from $5,981 to $81,594. The survey
sample population was fairly representative of the military in
that 86.17% of the force had incomes between the second and
fourth quintiles. Pay grades E-l through E-5 or 58.98% of the
force had incomes between the second and third quintiles. Only
the income levels of the flag officers exceeded the data
range. For this reason the food expenditure rates for income
levels were used in estimating average commissary savings.
Table 4-5 is a representation of a formula used by an
Army Research Institute (ARI) study conducted in 1984
[Ref. 54] . The study analyzed lifetime earnings for
civilian and military personnel. The Census Bureau's national
average for total food expenditures based on income level was
used to estimate commissary savings. It also assumed an
average commissary expenditure rate of 40%. This means that
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for every $100 spent for total food (at home and away from
home) $40 is spent at the commissary.
Table 4-6 takes a similar approach except that it
demonstrates a further break down on food expenditure rates.
It uses a commissary expenditure rate based on percentage of
at home food expenditures rather than total income as did the
ARI rate. It also uses a commissary savings rate of 20% vice
23% (explained in Chapter III) . The new approach estimates
the net commissary expenditure rate to be 11.74% which is
slightly higher than ARI's 9.8%. It also estimates the
average net commissary savings rate based on total income to
be 2.35% which again is slightly higher than ARI's 2.25%.
Table 4-7 provides an example using these expenditure rates.
Tables 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10 present estimates for the average

















9 .8% X 23% = 2 .25%





NET AT HOME FOOD
EXPENDITURE RATE
21.56% X 68 .10% _ 14 .68%














11 . 74% X 20% = 2 .35%
TABLE 4-6. Current Estimated Average Net Savings Rate.
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PAY GRADE E-5
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROSS INCOME $24,932.40
AVERAGE ANNUAL TOTAL FOOD EXPENDITURES
($25,284 X 21.56%)
$5,375.43
AVERAGE ANNUAL AT HOME FOOD EXPENDITURES
($25,284 X 14 .68%)
$789 .11
AVERAGE ANNUAL COMMISSARY FOOD EXPENDITURES
($25,284 X 11.74%)
$2,927.06
AVERAGE ANNUAL COMMISSARY SAVINGS
($25,284 X 2 .35%)
$585.91









E-l $1,356.90 $159.30 $31.89
E-2 $1,457 .40 $171 .10 $34 .25
E-3 $1,583.70 $185.93 $37.22
E-4 $1, 761.00 $206.74 $41.38
E-5 $2, 077 .70 $243 .92 $48.83
E-6 $2,333.90 $274 .00 $54 .85
E-7 $2,637.00 $309.58 $61.97
E-8 $3, 068.00 $360.18 $72 .10
E-9 $3,706.70 $435.17 $87.11









W-l $2,633.81 $309 .21 $61.89
W-2 $2,971.76 $348.88 $69 .84
W-3 $3,363.11 $394 .83 $79 .03
W-4 $3,990.11 $468 .44 $93 .77
W-5 $4,538.51 $532.82 $106.66










0-1 $2, 171 .66 $254 .95 $51.03
0-2 $2,836.76 $333.04 $66.66
0-3 $3,621.36 $425 .15 $85 .10
0-4 $4, 354 .46 $511.21 $102.33
0-5 $5,332.06 $625.98 $125.30
0-6 $6,519.16 $765.35 $153.20
0-7 $7,652.66 $898.42 $179 .84
TABLE 4-10. Officer Average Monthly Savings
The difficulty involved with measuring commissary
benefits should be apparent by now. As was demonstrated in
Table 4-1 the benefit's value measured from the employer's
perspective, is $66.67 per member. From a actual market
perspective the benefit ranges according to income level with
the officer's enjoying the greatest benefit.
According to Table 4-8 if the government decided to
eliminate taxpayer support for the commissary system and make
direct cash payments at $66.67 per member per month, pay
grades E-l through E-7, w-l and 0-1 to 0-2 would be satisfied.
If the $66.67 per month was added to the existing monthly BAS
rates, then enlisted and officer personnel would receive
annually over $3,100 and $2,500 respectively. The annual
national average food budget for single consumers is $2,517.
Assuming the government had an obligation to feed only the
service member and not dependents, enlisted personnel would
receive annually about $600 more the national average.
However, if given a choice some members might elect to receive
less than $66.67 per month in exchange for the freedom to shop
at local commercial stores.
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E. PROGRAM FEASIBILITY
One argument often cited to justify commissaries is the
need to adjust for low military pay. The cost savings
provided by commissaries helps extend the purchasing power of
the BAS . Therefore, if direct cash payment is more efficient
than commissaries then it would make sense to just add the
commuted payment onto the existing subsistence allowance. All
officers receive BAS but not all enlisted personnel receive
the allowance. Commuted payments would be reduced for those
enlisted personnel who receive subsistence in-kind and do not
draw BAS. This means that the estimated total enlisted costs
for direct cash payments will have to be reduced to account
for this occurrence. Table 4-11 calculates a percentage
estimate for enlisted personnel drawing BAS.
The estimated enlisted monthly commissary savings
calculated by Table 4-8 are used in Table 4-12 to compute
estimated enlisted force total monthly direct cash payment
costs. The projected FY95 manning levels used in Table 4-12
were developed through regression analysis of actual total
force manning levels for fiscal years 1989 through
1993. [Ref . 55] The same method was used to compute the FY95

















ENLISTED FORCE AVERAGE MARITAL RATE
ENLISTED FORCE AVERAGE SINGLE
AVERAGE SINGLE OFF -BASE









AVERAGE SINGLE ENLISTED DRAWING BAS
ENLISTED FORCE DRAWING BAS 67 .06%









(ROUNDED TO NEAREST DOLLAR)
E-l $31.89 49,609 $1,582,031
E-2 $34 .25 88,436 $3, 028,933
E-3 $37.22 182,135 $6,779,065
E-4 $41.38 307,406 $12, 720,460
E-5 $48.83 257, 107 $12,554,535
E-6 $54.85 203, 199 $11,145,465
E-7 $61.97 122,278 $7, 577, 568
E-8 $72 .10 28,438 $2,050,380
E-9 $87 .11 11,656 $1, 015, 354
TOTAL 1,250,359 $58,453, 791
ENLISTED FOFICE DRAWING BAS X 67.06%
TOTAL COSTS $39, 199,112








(ROUNDED TO NEAREST DOLLAR)
W-l $61.89 1, 729 $107,008
W-2 $69 .84 7,726 $539,584
W-3 $79 .03 5, 121 $404 , 713
W-4 $93 .77 2,252 $211, 170
W-5 $106.66 105 $11, 199
TOTAL $1,273, 674









(ROUNDED TO NEAREST DOLLAR)
0-1 $51.03 19,798 $1,010,292
0-2 $66.66 24,709 $1,647,102
0-3 $85.10 88,835 $7,559,859
0-4 $102.33 45,909 $4,697,868
0-5 $125.30 28,536 $3,575,561
0-6 $153.20 11,993 $1,837,328
0-7 $179.84 448 $80,568
0-8 $179 .84 310 $55, 750
0-9 $179 .84 110 $19,782
0-10 $179 .84 36 $6,474
TOTAL COSTS $20,490,584
TABLE 4-14. Estimated Officer Total Monthly Costs.
The estimated total costs calculated in Tables 4-12, 4-
13, and 4-14 are summed in Table 4-15 to estimate total annual
direct payment costs. Total annual direct payment program
costs were subtracted from the FY95 appropriated funds to
determine total annual direct cash payment savings in Table 4-
16. Realizing that only CONUS activities should be considered
at this time, Table 4-17 computes the annual estimated cost
savings for CONUS direct cash payments. The $90 million plus
in annual cost savings does not include indirect cost savings
from other agencies such as the Defense Personnel Support
Center (DPSC)
. According to the Jones Commission report, DPSC
CONUS commissary support costs were estimated to be
approximately $35 million in FY88. Indexing for inflation
could produce annual cost savings in excess of $130 million
making direct cash payments more efficient then the commissary
system.
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ENLISTED MONTHLY COSTS $39,199,112
WARRANT OFFICER MONTHLY COSTS $1,273,674
OFFICER MONTHLY COSTS $20,490,584
TOTAL MONTHLY DIRECT PAYMENT COSTS $60,963, 370
X 12 months
TOTAL ANNUAL DIRECT PAYMENT COSTS $731,560,440
TABLE 4-15. Total Annual Direct Payment Costs. (CONUS and Overseas)
TOTAL FY95 APPROPRIATED FUNDS
LESS ANNUAL DIRECT PAYMENT COSTS




TABLE 4-16. Total Annual Direct Payment Savings. (CONUS and Overseas)
ANNUAL DIRECT PAYMENT COSTS $731, 560,440
AVERAGE CONUS FORCE X 66.47%
ESTIMATED CONUS DIRECT PAYMENTS $486,268,224
TOTAL FY9 5 APPROPRIATED FUNDS $1,200,000,000
AVERAGE CONUS FUNDS RATE x 48.03%
FY9 5 ESTIMATED CONUS FUNDS $576,360,000
FY9 5 ESTIMATED CONUS FUNDS $576,360,000
ESTIMATED CONUS DIRECT PAYMENTS $486,268,222
ESTIMATED ANNUAL CONUS SAVINGS $90, 091,778
TABLE 4-17. Annual CONUS Direct Payment Savings.
This chapter presented data to analyze the nature of the
commissary benefit. A discussion was presented to address the
second thesis question concerning the legal right to
commissary benefits. It was determined that beneficiaries
have no legal claim to these benefits. The third thesis
question was answered pertaining to the value of the
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commissary benefit. This chapter also provided an analysis to
answer the last thesis question and determine if direct cash
payment was a feasible alternative to replace the commissary
system. Although many military spouses contend that the
enlisted $204.00 and officer $142.46 BAS rates are inadequate
to feed a family, the fact remains that the government is
obligated to feed only active duty members and not their
dependents. If military family pay is inadequate then the
overall compensation package needs to be increased without
discrimination to bachelors. The next chapter will present a
summary and provide conclusions. It will also provide program




This thesis analyzed the feasibility of direct cash
payments in lieu of commissary privileges for CONUS based
active duty personnel. This study presented a history of the
commissary system depicting a form of subsistence support that
evolved into a means for increasing family incomes that
further widens the dependent pay differential. From the
history presented in Chapter II it can be ascertained that the
commissary system was originally envisioned to support troops
stationed on the western frontier. However, due to the Army's
cavalier attitude in liberally interpreting the law, the
commissary system eventually expanded to all posts including
non- frontier and metropolitan locations. In the early
twentieth century the commissary system spread to the other
services. By the time congress took steps to curtail its
growth after World War II, the system had grown to become a
major food chain within the United States.
Many studies were conducted over the last thirty years
trying to justify the necessity for commissaries. Many of the
studies produced varied conclusions. The two main studies,
both the Bowers Commission and Jones Commission reports,
concentrated on improving the commissary system in order to
produce efficiencies that would secure the system's viability.
Both the 1969 Logistics Management Institute study and the
1967 First QRMC determined that government subsidies should be
discontinued for both exchanges and commissaries. The First
QRMC determined that commissaries and exchanges should no
longer be considered as elements of compensation when
determining military pay raises. One reason for not
considering these privileges as normal compensatory benefits
was the questionable obligation that could be placed on the
government. This questionable obligation stems from
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beneficiaries not being accessible to these facilities, i.e.
members serving on recruiting duty with no nearby commissary.
These members might then expect to receive a cash payment for
not receiving their commissary benefits. This situation has
also become a reality for many retirees due to the military
downsizing and the current ordered closing of 67 military
bases
.
Another reason was due to the inconsistency that they
present between military and civil service salaries. Since
military pay levels were linked to General Schedule Federal
employee salaries, which were comparable to private sector
salaries, the First QRMC concluded that the commissary and
exchange systems should no longer receive Government
subsidies. This was based on maintaining pay parity between
Federal civilian employees and the military. The study also
concluded that Government subsidized commissaries create an
increased income effect that is discriminatory to single
members. The pay distinctions created by the savings are
unequally accrued to various members. The member's value of
these privileges depends on income level, family size, family




Threats from the private sector grocery industry and from
Pentagon budgeteers will continue to plague the commissary
system. Future Defense budget reductions will induce further
pressure to find efficiencies within current program funding.
Along with other support programs the commissary system will
have to become leaner through consolidation of existing
operations. This consolidation will be in addition to current
base closure initiatives. The total effect will reduce the
number of commissary patrons which will lead to reduced
surcharge revenues. Reduced surcharge revenues will prevent
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the commissary system from enacting facility modernization
plans due to current fixed costs. To correct this situation
will require increased appropriated fund support or higher
surcharge rates. Higher surcharge rates will in turn reduce
customer patronage which will further amplify funding
shortfalls
.
The Pentagon has responded to this situation by expanding
commissary privileges to reserve personnel . Reserve personnel
were granted commissary privileges to 12 times per year.
Currently, the Pentagon is considering an increase in
frequency of reserve privileges to 48 times per year. But
this is only a short term solution to reverse decreasing
commissary sales. Sales will continue to constrict due to
base closures and the reduction in active duty personnel by
another 100,000 to a final total force of 1.4 million.
The current value of the commissary privilege will
continue to erode either through inaccessibility or higher
surcharges. The analysis presented in Chapter IV clearly
demonstrates that the third privatization alternative of
direct cash payment in lieu of commissary privileges is a
viable alternative. The savings could be apportioned in such
a manner as to also provide some compensation for retired
personnel should this be considered necessary.
Another threat that may eventually surface is the
dependent pay differential that is inherent in the military
compensation system. In developing basic principles for
military compensation the Seventh QRMC determined that any pay
differential based on other than status, skill or location is
incorrect and discriminatory. Subsidized commissaries just
add to this discriminatory practice. This could in turn
create added pressure to end government subsidies' for
commissaries
.
And finally, it can be concluded that direct cash
payments are more efficient than commissary privileges. The
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savings derived from such a program could exceed $130 million
per year. The savings could also be used to balance the pay-
differential between officer and enlisted BAS rates.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Commissary Subsidies Should be Discontinued.
All taxpayer support for commissaries should be discontinued.
Commissaries should not necessarily be eliminated but should
simply become self-sufficient. Those stores that are
considered to be a necessary convenience can continue to
operate as part of the base exchange system. This would then
make them similar to existing on-base convenience stores.
2 . BAS Rates Should be Equal for Officers and Enlisted .
The Government does have an obligation to feed active
duty service personnel. The obligation to feed military
troops should be equal to all service members including
officers. Currently, enlisted members receive approximately
$60.00 per month more in BAS then do officers. This
difference is due to enlisted BAS rates being linked to
increases in mess hall daily food allowances and officer BAS
rates being linked to annual pay raises. Cost savings from




BAS Should Match Single Consumer Expenditure Rates .
The Government does not have an obligation to feed families.
Levels of BAS should be comparable to the national average
Consumer Food Expenditure rates for single individuals
published by the Census Bureau. If military income levels are
considered inadequate to provide a normal standard of living
for families based on national averages then income levels
should be increased accordingly. The military compensation
system should not discriminate against bachelors by providing
additional income to families.
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4 . Cash Payments in Lieu of Commissary Privileges .
Although the Government does not have any obligation to make
cash payments in lieu of commissary privileges it might do so
for two reasons. First, it should be used to equalize officer
and enlisted BAS rates. And second, it should be used to
provide BAS increases in order to offset some of the lost
income. This would be needed in order to maintain the
existing "quality of life" standard. The best time to
implement would be during the annual January pay raise. This
would make the change less dramatic.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Other areas suitable for future research are the effects
of the dependent pay differential and in- kind compensation
practices. The dependent pay differential might encourage
service members to marry sooner then they would normally.
This practice of members marrying sooner to receive additional
pay benefits eventually leads to household growth that might
be faster than national averages. This in turn could cause
more problems for the Pentagon due to increased demand for
housing, child care facilities and other family service
support. Although "needs based" compensation would appear to
be less costly to the Government, it may eventually lead to
overall increased costs.
Another area that might be suitable for future research
is the practice of in-kind compensation. This practice was a
normal business practice in the first half of the century but
is now an archaic practice within CONUS . The military
contends that young men and women are not ready to live on
their own and must be fed and housed on military bases. This
practice allows the military to be visualized as a caring
employer. The military also cites that from a training
perspective both camaraderie and teamwork are developed and
reinforced from troops living and eating together. But these
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attributes seem to be just as important to the private sector
as the military. The answer might be found by studying how
the private sector develops these characteristics. Since the
draft is gone and military service is an occupation similar to
others in the private sector, perhaps in-kind compensation may
act more as a deterrence to military service and should be
discontinued. If the military is going to compete with the
private sector for future labor, then perhaps its compensation
should be more in line with the private sector.
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